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JUDGES IN POLITICS
WILLIAM ATHA MASON
of the Ninth Jutdicial District Bar

"The place of justice is a hallowed place and therefore not only
the Bench but the foot pace and precincts and purpose thereof
ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption," said Sir
Francis Bacon in his famous essay "of Judicature."
In Colorado a great deal of thought and study has been given
to the selection of judges. The most important consideration would
seem to be that of taking the selection of judges "out of politics." To
date our Colorado judges are nominated by party convention and
are bound to be in politics at least to the extent necessary for promoting their own candidacy.
Notwithstanding the fact that our judges are in politics, I
think that Canons 28 and 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics1 of the
American Bar Association should serve as a guide for all judges.
At the last convention of the American Bar Association, Canon 28
was amended to permit a judge to engage to a limited extent in
politics in states where he must be nominated and elected on party
ticket. This amendment was similar to the rule in Michigan which
has the same problem as does Colorado with respect to the political
selection of judges. The Michigan Supreme Court modernized its
Judicial Canons to conform to the needs of the situation amending
Canon No. 28 to read as follows:
Nothing herein contained, however, shall prevent the judge from
participating in partisan politics to the extent of attending political
gatherings the same as he did before his election to the Bench; but
he shall not make any promises, either direct or indirect, which shall
tend to bind him as to cases that might come before him if he is
elected or re-elected. He shall not be precluded from making contributions to the campaign funds to the party that has nominated
him or seeks his election or re-election.

The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar Association as early as the year 1908. They were recommended as a standard of professional conduct for the lawyers of
Colorado by our Supreme Court Rule 83E, adopted by Rule 228
of the Colo. R. C. P. and published as Appendix C thereof. The
Canons of Judicial Ethics were first adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1924, but to my knowledge they have never been
promulgated by the Colorado Supreme Court as a rule of conduct
for Colorado judges.
I occupied the county bench for a number of years in Garfield
county before I was fully aware of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
I See Canons of Judicial Ethics in this issue of
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of the American Bar Association. In fact, I served for a period
of time as county chairman of one of the political parties because
of a precedent set in our county that the county judge held such
chairmanship for a part of the time that he was in office. Not
until I was on the state association's judiciary committee did I
become aware of the American Bar Association canons.
At this same time, I became a candidate for a different office,
and because of this Canon 30, I resigned as chairman of my party
and also as county judge because I was seeking a non-judicial office.
I received some criticism for resigning, and it was pointed out to me
that judges from various Colorado courts had sought other offices
and had not resigned. I was, and am, aware that judges of even
our highest court have become candidates for political office other
than re-election to the judiciary. Perhaps this causes no great
harm, but this much I know is true: While they are campaigning for election to another office-presumably a promotion-the
work of the court must necessarily suffer, for a judge cannot
campaign and at the same time take care of his judicial duties.
It is not fair to expect the public to pay the salary of a judge while
he is campaigning for election to a non-judicial office. There is
also a tendency to cause the public's opinion of the judiciary to
be lowered to the common political plane.
During the heat of our last political campaign and in many
preceding ones, some of our judges have made a practice of giving
political speeches and publicly endorsing candidates for political
office. This practice violates the spirit of Canon 28. To publicly
promote or endorse one candidate over another will certainly lead
to the suspicion that that judge will be biased when at any time
that candidate appears before him. I believe the acts of a judge
should be free from partiality, bias or prejudice and should never
be actuated by any selfish motive. He should never use his office
to advance either the private or political welfare of himself or
another. His work should be carried on and his judgment rendered
in a sound, judicial atmosphere untainted by the currents of political controversy, ambition and contest.
JUDICIAL CANONS SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN COLORADO

In the Preamble to the Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted
in 1924, the American Bar Association, being "mindful that the
character and conduct of a judge should never be the objects of
indifference, and that the declared ethical standards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to set forth its view respecting those principles which should govern the personal practice of
the members of the judiciary in the administration of their office."
The association accordingly set forth the canons, "the spirit of
which it suggests as a proper guide and reminder for judges and
as indicating what the people have a right to expect of them."
These are excellent principles of good judicial conduct. Even
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though the Canons of Judicial Ethics have not been adopted in
our own state, I believe that the most of the judges of Colorado
would welcome them. Judges who are members of the American
Bar Association are expected to observe these canons. However,
since most of our Colorado judges are not members, I suggest that
the Colorado Bar Association arrange to have all of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics printed and distributed to the judges of courts
of record throughout the State of Colorado for their approval.
The Board of Governors might well recommend to the Supreme
Court the adoption of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association as the standard for judicial conduct of
judges within our own state.
For many centuries the doctor has been confronted with the
challenge, oftentimes derisive, "Physician, Heal Thyself!" The
judge, with his vaunted prowess in judging human conduct and
settling vexatious disputes, is with equal aptness enjoined, "Your
Honor, Judge Thyself!"

NEW LIGHT ON JUDGES AND POLITICS?*
* ** Following are the headnote summaries of Opinion No. 3
of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics of the California
Group, handed down on January 3:
"Acceptance by a judge of membership on the local advisory
council of a national nonpartisan organization whose stated object
is to improve the status of women and, in particular, to secure the
passage of the so-called 'Equal Rights' amendment to the Constitution of the United States, would not constitute a violation of
Canon 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics; other considerations
noted.
"A judge may, under certain circumstances, lend his name publicly to the proponents or opponents of a proposed city or county
charter amendment or of a proposed ordinance submitted to the
vote of the people without violating" the same canon.
A few weeks before, the following resolution, adopted by the
Executive Committee of the Massachusetts Bar Association, received attention in the newspapers of that state ... :
"For the purpose of maintaining the dignity of, and public
confidence in, the courts of the Commonwealth and freeing them
from affording a basis of adverse criticism, the Massachusetts Bar
Association urges that no justice of any court of the Commonwealth
engage in partisan political campaigns, either by way of running
for office, serving on political or campaign committees, acting as
delegate, or otherwise taking part in political conventions or engaging in like activities in such campaigns." * * *
* With the exception of the question mark, which is the Editor's own, this excerpt
and title is reprinted with appreciation from the Journal of the American Judicature

Society for February, 1951.
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*

ANCIENT PRECEDENTS
"And I charged your judges at that time, saying Hear the causes between
your brethren, and judge righteously between every man and his brother, and
the stranger that is with him.
"Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as
well as the great; ye shall not be afraid of the face of man; for the judgment
is God's; and the cause that is too hard for you, bring it unto me, and I will
hear it."-Deuteronogmy, I, 16-17.
"Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, neither
take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of
the righteous."-Deuteronomy,XVI, 19.
"We will not make any justiciaries, constables, sheriffs or bailiffs, but from
those who understand the law of the realm and are well disposed to observe
it."-Magna Charta, XLV.
"Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere not jus dare; to
interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." . . .
"Judges ought to be more learned than witty; more reverend than plausible;
and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and
proper virtue." . . .
"Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an
over speaking judge is not well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first
to find that which he might have heard in due time from the Bar, or to show
quickness of conceit in cutting off evidence or counsel too short; or to prevent
information by questions though pertinent."
"The place of justice is a hallowed place; and therefore not only the Bench,
but the foot pace and precincts and purprise thereof ought to be preserved without scandal and corruption." ...
-- Bacon's Essay "of Judicature."
PREAMBLE
In addition to the Canons for Professional Conduct of Lawyers which it has
formulated and adopted, the American Bar Association, mindful that the character and conduct of a judge should never be objects of indifference, and that
declared ethical standards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to
set forth its views respecting those principles which should govern the personal
practice of members of the judiciary in the administration of their office. The
Association accordingly adopts the following Canons, the spirit of which it
suggests as a proper guide and reminder for judges, and as indicating what the
people have a right to expect from them.
1. RELATIONS OF THE JUDICIARY.
The assumption of the office of judge casts upon the incumbent duties in
respect to his personal conduct which concern his relations to the state and its
inhabitants, the litigants before him, the principles of law, the practitioners of
law in his court, and the witnesses, jurors and attendants who aid him in the
administration of its functions.
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
Courts exist to promote justice, and thus to serve the public interest. Their
administration should be speedy and careful. Every judge should at all times
These Canons, to and including Canon 34, were adopted by the American Bar
Association at its Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on
July 9, 1924. Canons 28 and 30 were amended at the Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 30-September 1, 1933.
Canons 35 and 36 were
adopted at the Sixtieth Annual Meeting, at Kansas City, Missouri, September 30, 1937.
Canon 28 was further amended at the Seventy-third Annual Meeting in Washington,
D. C., September 20, 1950.
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be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of the court, so far as
he can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid
unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for
the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
It is the duty of all judges in the United States to support the federal Constitution and that of the state whose laws they administer; in so doing, they
should fearlessly observe and apply fundamental limitations and guarantees.
4. AVOIDANCE OF IMPROPRIETY.
A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; he should avoid infractions of law; and his personal
behavior, not only upon the Bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach.
5. ESSENTIAL CONDUCT.
A judge should be temperate, attentive, patient, impartial, and, since he
is to administer the law and apply it to the facts, he should be studious of the
principles of the law and diligent in endeavoring to ascertain the facts.
6. INDUSTRY.
A judge should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the
duties imposed upon him.
7. PROMPTNESS.
A judge should be prompt in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, jurors and attorneys is of value and that habitual lack of punctuality on his part justifies dissatisfaction with the administration of the business of the court.
8. COURT ORGANIZATION.
A judge should organize the court with a view to the prompt and convenient
dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks,
and other assistants who are sometimes prone to presume too much upon his
good natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association with him.
It is desirable too, where the judicial system permits, that he should
cooperate with other judges of the same court, and in other courts, as members
of a single judicial system, to promote the more satisfactory administration of
justice.
9. CONSIDERATION FOR JURORS AND OTHERS.
A judge should be considerate of jurors, witnesses and others in attendance
upon the court.
10. COURTESY AND CIVILITY.
A judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young
and inexperienced, and also to all others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court.
He should also require, and so far as his power extends, enforce on the part
of clerks, court officers and counsel civility and courtesy to the court and to
jurors, witnesses, litigants and others having business in the court.
11. UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSEL.
A judge should utilize his opportunities to criticise and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counsellors, brought to his attention; and, if
adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the matter at once
to the proper investigating and disciplinary authorities.
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12. APPOINTEES OF THE JUDICIARY AND THEIR COMPENSATION.
Trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians and other persons appointed by a judge to aid in the administration of justice should have the
strictest probity and impartiality and should be selected with a view solely to
their character and fitness. The power of making such appointments should
not be exercised by him for personal or partisan advantage. He should not
permit his appointments to be controlled by others than himself. He should also
avoid nepotism and undue favoritism in his appointments.
While not hesitating to fix or approve just amounts, he should be most
scrupulous in granting or approving compensation for the services or charges
of such appointees to avoid excessive allowances, whether or not excepted to or
complained of. He cannot rid himself of this responsibility by the consent of
counsel.
13. KINSHIP OR INFLUENCE.
A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party;
he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can
improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by
the kinship, rank, position or influence of any party or other person.
14. INDEPENDENCE.
A judge should not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamor or considerations of personal popularity or notoriety, nor be apprehensive of unjust
criticism.
15. INTERFERENCE IN CONDUCT OF TRIAL.
A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition,
and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he
should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation
in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances
of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the
ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
Conversation between the judge and counsel in court is often necessary,
but the judge should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure
the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition.
In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should avoid a controversial
manner or tone.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to
clarify his mind as to their positions, and he should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of learning or a premature judgment.
16. EX PARTE APPLICATIONS.
A judge should discourage ex parte hearings of applications for injunctions
and receiverships where the order may work detriment to absent parties; he
should act upon such ex parte applications only where the necessity for quick
action is clearly shown; if this be demonstrated, then he should endeavor to
counteract the effect of the absence of opposing counsel by a scrupulous crossexamination and investigation as to the facts and the principles of law on which
the application is based, granting relief only when fully satisfied that the law
permits it and the emergency demands it. He should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of defendants and should not be
granted lightly or inadvisedly. One applying for such relief must sustain the
burden of showing clearly its necessity and this burden is increased in the
absence of the party whose freedom of action is sought to be restrained even
though only temporarily.
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17. EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS.
A judge should not permit private interviews, arguments or communications
designed to influence his judicial action, where interests to be affected thereby
are not represented before him, except in cases where provision is made by
law for ex parte application.
While the conditions under which briefs of argument are to be received
are largely matters of local rule or practice, he should not permit the contents
of such brief presented to him to be concealed from opposing counsel. Ordinarily all communications of counsel to the judge intended or calculated to
influence action should be made known to opposing counsel.
18. CONTINUANCES.
Delay in the administration of justice is a common cause of complaint;
counsel are frequently responsible for this delay. A judge, without being arbitrary or forcing cases unreasonably or unjustly to trial when unprepared, to the
detriment of parties, may well endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the public interest, to their own clients, and to the adverse
party and his counsel, so as to enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business
before the court.
19. JUDICIAL OPINIONS.
In disposing of controverted cases, a judge should indicate the reasons for
his action in an opinion showing that he has not disregarded or overlooked
serious arguments of counsel. He thus shows his full understanding of the
case, avoids the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promotes confidence in his
intellectual integrity and may contribute useful precedent to the growth of the
law.
It is desirable that Courts of Appeals in reversing cases and granting new
trials should so indicate their views on questions of law argued before them and
necessarily arising in the controversy that upon the new trial counsel may be
aided to avoid the repetition of erroneous positions of law and shall not be left
in doubt by the failure of the court to decide such questions.
But the volume of reported decisions is such and is so rapidly increasing
that in writing opinions which are to be published judges may well take this
fact into consideration, and curtail them accordingly, without substantially departing from the principles stated above.
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last resort
should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the
consequent influence of judicial decision. A judge should not yield to pride
of opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than that of the court
to which he should be loyal. Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged in
courts of last resort.
20. INFLUENCE OF DECISIONS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW.
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law
to particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and
that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks
to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such
action may become a precedent unsettling accepted principles and may have
detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law.
21. IDIOSYNCRASIES AND INCONSISTENCIES.
Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those who
administer it. A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing
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justice, and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgments, or spectacular
or sensational in the conduct of the court. Though vested with discretion in the
imposition of mild or severe sentences he should not compel persons brought
before him to submit to some humiliating act or discipline of his own devising,
without authority of law, because he thinks it will have a beneficial corrective
influence.
In imposing sentence he should endeavor to conform to a reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional severity or undue leniency.
22. REVIEW.
In order that a litigant may secure the full benefit of the right of review
accorded to him by law, a trial judge should scrupulously grant to the defeated
party opportunity to present the questions arising upon the trial exactly as they
arose, were presented, and decided, by full and fair bill of exceptions or otherwise; any failure in this regard on the part of the judge is peculiarly worthy of
condemnation because the wrong done may be irremediable.
23. LEGISLATION.
A judge has exceptional opportunity to observe the operation of statutes,
especially those relating to practice, and to ascertain whether they tend to
impede the just disposition of controversies; and he may well contribute to the
public interest by advising those having authority to remedy defects of procedure, of the results of his observation and experience.
24. INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS.
A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pecuniary or otherwise, which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with
his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official functions.
25. BUSINESS PROMOTIONS AND SOLICITATIONS FOR CHARITY.
A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspicion that he
is utilizing the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to
patronize or contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to
charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor
use the power of his office or the influence of his name to promote the business
interests of others; he should not solicit for charities, nor should he enter into
any business relation which, in the normal course of events reasonably to be
expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the impartial
performance of his official duties.
26. PERSONAL INVESTMENTS AND RELATIONS.
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises
which are apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after his accession
to the Bench, he should not retain such investments previously made, longer
than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss.
It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations
warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the
administration of his judicial duties.
He should not utilize information coming to him in a judicial capacity for
purposes of speculation; and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and the soundness of his judicial judgment for him at any time to become a speculative investor upon the hazard of a margin.
27. EXECUTORSHIPS AND TRUSTEESHIPS.
While a judge is not disqualified from holding executorships or trusteeships,
he should not accept or continue to hold any fiduciary or other position if the
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seem to interfere with the proper performance
business interests of those represented require
are apt to come before him judicially, or to be
be determined by him.

28. PARTISAN POLITICS.*
While entitled to entertain his personal views of political questions, and
while not required to surrender his rights or opinions as a citizen, it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a judge
who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against
another. He should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or contributions to party funds, the public endorsement
of candidates for political office and participation in party conventions.
He should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee nor act
as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities. Where, however,
it is necessary for judges to be nominated and elected as candidates of a political party, nothing herein contained shall prevent the judge from participating
in partisan politics to the extent of attending or speaking at political gatherings,
or from making contributions to the campaign funds of the party that has
nominated him and seeks his election or re-election.

A judge
act in which
in the court
account, but
controversy.

29. SELF-INTEREST.
should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial
his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation
of which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that
he should, of course, refrain from any judicial act in such a

30. CANDIDACY FOR OFFICE.*
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make
for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices
of the appointing or electing power; he should not announce in advance his
conclusions of law on disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do
nothing while a candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
While holding a judicial position he should not become an active candidate
either at a party primary or at a general election for any office other than a
judicial office. If a judge should decide to become a candidate for any office
not judicial, he should resign in order that it cannot be said that he is using
the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his own candidacy or
the success of his party.
If a judge becomes a candidate for any judicial office, he should refrain from
all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is using
the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy or the
success of his party.
He should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his candidacy which
would reasonably lead to such suspicion.
31. PRIVATE LAW PRACTICE.
In many states the practice of law by one holding judicial position is forbidden. In superior courts of general jurisdiction, it should never be permitted.
In inferior courts in some states, it is permitted because the county or municipality is not able to pay adequate living compensation for a competent judge.
In such cases one who practices law is in a position of great delicacy and must
* As amended August 31, 1933, except for the last sentence of Canon 28 which
was adopted on September 20, 1950.
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be scrupulously careful to avoid conduct in his practice whereby he utilizes or
seems to utilize his judicial position to further his professional success.
He should not practice in the court in which he is a judge, even when presided over by another judge, or appear therein for himself in any controversy.
If forbidden to practice law, he should refrain from accepting any professional employment while in office.
He may properly act as arbitrator or lecture upon or instruct in law, or
write upon the subject, and accept compensation therefor, if such course does
not interfere with the due performance of his judicial duties, and is not forbidden by some positive provision of law.
32. GIFTS AND FAVORS.
A judge should not accept any presents or favors from litigants, or from
lawyers practicing before him or from others whose interests are likely to be
submitted to him for judgment.
33. SOCIAL RELATIONS.
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that a judge
should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as reasonable
attention to the completion of his work will permit, he continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that he should not discontinue his interest in or appearance at meetings of members of the Bar. He should, however, in pending or
prospective litigation before him be particularly careful to avoid such action as
may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in influencing his judicial conduct.
34. A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL OBLIGATION.
In every particular his conduct should be above reproach. He should be
conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial,
fearless of public clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private
political or partisan influences; he should administer justice according to law,
and deal with his appointments as a public trust; he should not allow other
affairs or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his judicial duties, nor should he administer the office for the purpose
of advancing his personal ambitions or increasing his popularity.
35. IMPROPER PUBLICIZING OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.*
Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court
and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and
should not be permitted.
36. CONDUCT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.*
Proceedings in court should be so conducted as to reflect the importance
and seriousness of the inquiry to ascertain the truth.
The oath should be administered to witnesses in a manner calculated to
impress them with the importance and solemnity of their promise to adhere to
the truth. Each witness should be sworn separately and impressively at the
bar or the court, and the clerk should be required to make a formal record of
the administration of the oath, including the name of the witness.
* Adopted September 30, 1937.
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DO BUSINESS AND LAW MIX?
MAURICE REULER*
of the Denver Bar

"It is not necessarily improper for a lawyer to engage in a
business, but he must conduct it in a manner not inconsistent with
the Canons."'
The foregoing statement, as will be seen upon perusal, would
leave one with the inference that while there is nothing per se
wrong with a lawyer engaging in commercial enterprise, still such
a lawyer would be bound to exercise a greater degree of care in the
conduct of such an enterprise than would the ordinary businessman. The subsequent opinions based upon Canon 27,2 which is the
one prohibiting advertising, direct and indirect, all bear out the
thought that while a lawyer may own a business, still he must
separate and place a wall between his business self and his legal
self in order that his legal self will be, like Casesar's wife, above
suspicion. The problem presented by Canon 27 is like all other
moral questions, a matter of degree.
For example, it is provided that it is not improper for an
attorney to accept employment as a claim adjuster from a corporation which adjusts claims, and then also to represent it in litigation. 3 The rationale given here is that the employment as a claim
adjuster did not exploit the lawyer's professional services, nor did
the lawyer share his professional earnings with the corporation.
However, the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
has also ruled that it is unethical for an attorney to participate in
either legal or collection activities of a business in which he has a
financial interest, although the lawyer may own such interest in
the agency if he does not participate therein, and nothing is done
to create the impression that the agency enjoys the benefit of the
attorney's advice. 4 The Committee stated:
We are of the opinion that a practicing lawyer cannot participate
in the collection activities or the management of an agency which
solicits the collection of claims. If a lawyer is to participate in such
activities, he must withdraw from the practice and refrain from
holding himself out as a lawyer.5

The committee has also ruled that it is improper for an attorney who does nothing but adjusting, to have his name appear on
law firm stationery as adjuster, and on the door of the firm as adThe author wishes to express his thanks to Messrs. William Sackmann and
Robert Gee. both of the Denver bar, for their constructive suggestions and assistance in
the preparation of this article.
1 OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, American

Bar Association (1947) Canon 27, Opinion 57, p. 150.
Ibid.
'Ibid, Opinion 96, p. 208.
4 Ibid., Opinion 225, p. 447.
5 Supra, Opinion 225, p. 449.
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juster, who in case of suit, recommends the firm upon whose stationery, and upon whose door his name appearsY
It will be noted that there appears to be some inconsistency in
the opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances in that it is proper under their rulings for an attorney to
adjust and prosecute a claim if an adjustment fails, while, on the
other hand, it is improper for an attorney to operate an adjustment
business from a law office where his name appears on the door and
on the law firm stationery as adjuster, and he recommends the
firm in case of suit. The inconsistency, like so many inconsistencies of law, is more illusory than real when we consider the basic
reason for the rule. The foundation for the rulings on this branch
of professional ethics appears to hinge on a determination of the
question: Is the commercial pursuit of the lawyer used as a means
of indirect solicitation for his professional life? If the attorney
engaging in a business uses that business indirectly to solicit professional employment, he is violating Canon 27.1
DEMARCATION OF CONDUCT DIFFICULT

All of us would recognize the clear violation of the particular
provision of the code of ethics here under consideration. There is
no doubt that an attorney could not advertise an abstracting business with his name prominently displayed as attorney at law
immediately thereunder, but, as in so many situations, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain where the clear violation ends, and the
proper conduct of a non-professional enterprise begins.
There have been a few cases which have considered this question. In one of them, an attorney sent out 5800 postcards under
the name "Libarian Tax Service." These cards contained statements that this tax service had a competent staff well able to take
care of income tax problems, and was under the direction of
Stephen Libarian. Mr. Libarian's law office was located in Los
Angeles, where he maintained large signs stating that free parking was available, and further informing the public that Stephen
Libarian was an attorney. The court in condemning all of these
practices held that the purpose of the postcards was the solicitation of legal business, and that the gentleman's activities merited
a one-year suspension from the bar."
In another situation, an attorney was employed by a collection agency as office girl and stenographer at the munificent salary
of $80 per month. Her contract further provided that she could
engage in the private practice of law, and was to rtceive from the
collection agency $5 and $10 per judgment collected by them. The
members of the agency completed all forms preparatory to instituting suit on any case sent to them. The respondent signed the
'Ibid., Opinion 214, p. 427.

'Ibid.
'Libarian

v. State Bar of California, 25 Calif. 2d 314, 153 P.

2d 739 (1944).
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papers and proceeded to take them to court. This attorney was
found guilty of professional misconduct in lending her name to an
organization which was engaged in the unauthorized practice of
lawY So, also, was an attorney the subject of censure where he
organized a legitimate collection agency with offices located in several states, but the letterheads of which agency contained his name
as attorney, giving, so the court felt, the impression that he was
licensed to practice in all of the states in which the collection office
was located, when, in fact, he was licensed only in New York. 10
An interesting situation arose in Minnesota. Here, the respondent attorney was employed as vice-president of a bank at an
annual salary. The terms of the contract with the bank provided
that he was to be permitted to practice law, but he agreed to turn
over all fees received to the bank. The respondent sent out his
opinions on bank stationery, although he conducted his legal business in a separate room. The court, in ruling on this matter, held
that the conduct of the attorney amounted to the corporate practice of law, and the respondent was severely censured. 1 Another
enterprising Minnesota lawyer was engaged in the real estate
business, sometimes for himself, and sometimes for others. The
court said that the attorney must exercise a higher degree of care
than that
exercised by laymen in the conduct of their private
12
affairs.
DOING PROPER ACTION IMPROPERLY

In all the cases cited, it appears that the attorney, although
doing that which would be normally proper, by his method of operation made it improper. Many attorneys, as we know, do engage
in some non-professional side line of a commercial nature, and it
is difficult to know when they may be unconsciously stepping near
the line of a violation of Canon 27. It is perfectly clear that an
attorney could not engage in a business pursuit which would conflict as such with his legal profession. For instance, it would be
highly improper, it seems to the writer, for an attorney, if he
were also a real estate broker, to sell a piece of property and then
in the very next breath, examine the abstract to the property.
However, the problem tends to shade more to the gray when we
examine the situation of an attorney who has his desk in a real
estate office, but has no financial connection with it. In such a
case, where a piece of property is sold by the real estate broker,
that broker recommends the attorney as the proper person to
examine the abstract . Whether or not the attorney is violating
the Canons of Professional Ethics in the above example is rather
hard to ascertain. The writer queried several of his brethren at
Yount v. Zarbell, 17 Wash. 2d 278, 135 P. 2d 309 (1943).
Application of J. W. Roe Co., Inc. in re Schwartz, 181 N. Y. Supp. 87 (1920).
"In
re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930).
"In re Waleen, 190 Minn. 13, 250 N. W. 798 (1933).
10
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the bar, and they expressed practically an equal division of opinion
as to whether or not the attorney should accept the abstract. It is
the opinion of the writer that there is nothing improper in the
above situation, but that, as in the case of a trustee, the burden
would be on the attorney to prove the fairness of his transactions
if a question were raised.
MASS. CASE SHEDS A LITTLE LIGHT

Perhaps the best reasoned case which was found is In Re
Thibodeau.13 Here, the respondent, a duly licensed attorney and
a partner in a prominent law firm, organized what he called the
"Automobile Legal Association." This association had a sales manager and a good many salesmen, with principal offices located in
New England, New York and New Jersey. The association advertised continuously. For an annual fee, among the services which
they provided were road, garage, and an emergency medical aid in
case of accident. Their articles of agreement provided further
that they would aid in the procurement of bail bonds, and that if
a member were charged with drunk or reckless driving, or with
manslaughter, they would pay the fee, within certain set limits, of
the attorney hired to defend the member. The association also
agreed to pay the fee of any attorney hired by a member in case of
property damage actions brought against the customer. The association furnished a list of attorneys to its members, but specifically
stated therein that the members need not hire these attorneys.
The attorneys' list also contained the statement that the association did not hold itself out as qualified to practice law. On the
attorneys' list were the names of the respondent's partner, as well
as a partner's son. The offices of respondent's firm were located
next door to the Automobile Legal Association. There was, howewer, no adjoining entrance to the two suites. The evidence produced indicated that occasionally, members of the service organization went into the law office of respondent's partners; s',me few
of them became clients. The court in considering the problems
raised by the above situation ruled:
(a) It cannot be doubted that the solicitation by a lawyer of
employment in legal matters by means of salesmen and advertising
here disclosed, would be a gross impropriety which would at once
subject him to discipline. On the other hand, commonly, a member
of the Bar is free to engage in commercial pursuits of an honorable
character, and to advertise and to extend his purely mercantile
busi4
ness honestly and fairly by ordinary commercial methods.
(b) In our opinion, the business conducted by the respondent
under the name of the Association is not the practice of law. The
respondent performs none of the legal work for which the Association
pays. He does not employ the lawyers who do the work. He does
not direct or control them. All the respondent does is to furnish a
1"295 Mass. 374, 3 N. E.
". Supra, p. 750.

2d 749 (1936).
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list of competent attorneys which subscribers mayuse if they desire,
and to pay such attorneys as subscribers employ. Any layman could
lawfully do these things . . . As the respondent's business, conducted
under the name of the Association, is not the practice of law, it follows
that the solicitation of subscribers and the presentation to the public
of the advantages of the Association are not, in themselves, improper.' 5
(c) [As to members of respondent's law firm] this presents a
situation of some delicacy which could easily become the subject of
abuse. Confining ourselves strictly to the facts found, however, we
incline to the opinion that no present impropriety is shown. It does
not appear that the respondent's law firm derives any direct advantage
in its practice from the Association business of the respondent, or
that the Association is conducted with that end in view. The Association business is a genuine business. There is nothing to indicate
that the precautions taken to separate the Association from the law
firm are not real, or that they cover any subterfuge. Any indirect
profit or advantage which the firm receives from the publicity given
the Association is very small and incidental, and, apparently, no
greater than that which any firm of lawyers might receive through
the connection of its members with substantial business enterprises
such as banks or insurance companies, or through its members, doing
business as trustees, receivers, or in like capacity. It has never been
thought improper for a lawyer to extend his acquaintance, or to enhance his prestige in these ways, even though it has a tendency to
bring him to the attention of possible clients and thus to increase
his law practice.'"

It will be noted that the court in the foregoing opinion, first
states the general rule that it is perfectly proper for an attorney
to be associated in a business enterprise so long as the enterprise
does not entail, nor serve as an entree toward getting new clients
for the attorney participating therein. The test in determining
whether, in a given instance, the attorney's activities come within
the ban is pragmatic. The court says the business is genuine, and
any benfits which come to the attorney's law firm are indirect.
The court leaves plain, however, the inferences that the attorney
may become guilty of a violation of professional ethics if he does
not conduct himself in relation to his two interests with the utmost
propriety.
ONLY ONE COLORADO CASE

There is, so far as the writer could discover, only one Colorado case which bears on the point at issue. It would seem to follow the test laid down by the Massachusetts court.1 7 A Colorado
state senator was found guilty of unprofessional conduct, when
as an attorney, he accepted retainers from certain insurance companies which were being investigated by a committee of which he
was chairman in the state senate.' 8 The court points out that it
is no violation of ethics for a state senator to practice law. The
violation lay in his combination of the jobs.
"Supra, pp. 751-752.
," Supra, p. 752.
,In re Thibodeau, supra, n. 13.
" People v. Nolan, 100 Colo. 275, 67 P. 2d 76 (1937).
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In attempting to draw a conclusion from the cases and opinions, it would seem that in order to avoid a violation of Canon 27,
the attorney must first be sure that his non-professional enterprise is not a mode whereby he engages in indirect solicitation for
clients, and second, that, as an attorney, he is not the arm of some
lay organization which through him, is, in effect, practicing law.
In summary, it is submitted that any attorney may engage
in a commercial enterprise without fear of violating Canon 27, provided such enterprise is kept entirely separate from his legal life,
and provided that he acts with the highest degree of rectitude in
the conduct of his business enterprise.

WILLFUL WAYS
The following clauses appear in a will uncovered by John G.
Reid and Jean S. Breitenstein of Denver. For "reasons of delicacy"
the names and dates have been-changed, and we leave it to you and
Hu as to whether or not they should be included in the model will:
* * * Third, I give, devise and bequeath to Mariposa Maria Ruperta
Sanchez, widow of the late Ricardo Garcia and her and my children,
Luisita, born August 12, 1928, Estrellita, born Sept. 29, 1931, Ricardo
born June 30, 1934 and Ruperto, born December 1, 1937 the other onehalf of all my real and personal property after the payment of my debts
and the expenses of administration, the said parties to share equally in
said amount and in the event that after this date, and within nine
months after my death there shall be born to said Mariposa Maria
Ruperta Sanchez any child or children, then said child or children to
share equally in said one-half of property as fully as those hereinbefore
by name mentioned.
* * * Seventh, in the event, that said Leopold Sachs should decline
to serve as such executor, then I hereby authorize him to nominate and
select some fit and proper person to serve as such executor and ask the
Court to appoint the person so selected, excluding the following named
persons from his selection: Win. H. Stein, Jesus F. Stein, John Thomas,
Nathan Baer and George E. Westerbay. As I herein have requested,
that a copy of this my last will and testament be sent to my sister,
Fraulein Malivine Gross, I deem it necessary, to state here that I am
not married to the herein mentioned Mariposa Maria Ruperta Sanches
and to state also, that I, at no time have made to her any promise of
marriage. I deem these statements necessary so to avoid creating in
my sister's mind the belief that I have tried to deceive her in regards
to my personal affairs or relations as I, for reasons of delicacy, due her
sex and position and out of respect to her, never informed her of the
existence of these my children for all of whom I hereby bespeak her
good will and some part of that affection which she, at all times, has so
unlimitedly bestowed upon me and I add at the same time the request,
that she may not, from the nature of the relations existing between me
and the mother of these children, be brought to form a hasty, prejudiced
and therefor unjust judgment of and against the said Mariposa Maria
Ruperta Sanches and I also pray her, my sister's forgiveness for having
omitted to inform her previously of the existence of these children, my
reasons for this I have now here stated. * * *
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ADVERTISING AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
JAMES B. REED*
of the Dcn vcr Bar

In this modern era of high-pressure advertising, the practicing attorney must stand aside. He cannot resort to such media as
the newspaper, radio and television in building his practice. A
lawyer who uses methods of solicitation and advertising which
tend to lower respect for the profession in the eyes of the public
and to destroy confidence may find himself censured by his local
bar association or subjected to appropriate discipline by the courts.
Questions arise frequently concerning the use of circulars,
letters, and paid advertisements by today's practitioners. To guide
members of the bar and to protect the interests of the layman,
the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association periodically publishes opinions interpreting
the Canons of Professional Ethics.' Nearly one-third of the 283
opinions thus far issued have dealt with Canon 27. Entitled "Advertising, Direct or Indirect," the canon has been amended several times since its adoption in 1908; the last change occurring
in 1943 when the canon in its present form was promulgated:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect
advertisements for professional employment such as furnishing or
inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the attorney has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position,
and all other self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone
of our profession and are reprehensible; but the customary use of
simple professional cards is not improper.

The second paragraph of the canon which is not set down in detail
here deals with approved law lists and the form of publication
therein. This subject will be discussed very briefly later.
The words of the canon relating to solicitation have been given
a two-fold application by the Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievances which shall be referred to hereafter as the committee. The first application concerns the problem of solicitation
among lawyers. The initial opinion of the committee presented
the case of solicitation of business by an attorney from other members of the bar, with whom he had had no previous relations, by
means of circulars which stated fees in specific cases and which
offered 'bargain counter" prices. 2 The use of these circulars was
Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
All page references to opinions unless otherwise stated are to opinions published
in OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,

Bar Association (1947).

2Opinion 1, pp. 57-58.
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declared to be improper, the committee holding that the canon
applied to solicitation of lawyers and laymen alike. The holding
in Opinion 1 was reaffirmed in a later case 3 in which it was stated
that a lawyer could not properly send a card containing an offer
"to appear for them" to other members of the bar living outside
his own city. Other examples of improper solicitation among lawyers include the following: (1) solicitation of Mexican divorce
practice through a circular which could not be justified as a brief,
dignified notice of a specialized legal service sanctioned by Canon
46; 4 (2) solicitation of legal business from other attorneys not
living within one's own city on a reciprocal basis.;
Equally important as the matter of solicitation among lawyers
is that of solicitation of professional employment from the public,
with special emphasis upon the existence of personal relations.
The committee condemned the action of an attorney who had won
an important test case in subsequently seeking employment and
compensation from others who were benefited by the favorable
decision, when such solicitation was not justified by personal relations. 6 In another case of a similar nature, solicitation was allowed
because of prior dealings and relations even though the language
of the attorney's circular was misleading.7 A third opinion of
the -committee s disapproved of solicitation by an attorney of
strangers whose interests were similar to those of an unsolicited
client even though his motive in so acting was to protect the rights
of his client.
SEEKING NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY REPREHENSIBLE

The forms of indirect advertising involving use of photographs and newspaper comment declared by the canon to be reprehensible have been thoroughly discussed by the committee in several sharply worded opinions. Specifiically barred by Opinion 429
were the furnishing of pictures or materials for special newspaper
or magazine articles concerning divorce, and the posing for pictures of scenes laid in a divorce proceeding for publication in a
complimentary manner. In the same vein, publication of a lawyer's picture in a prominent citizens' gallery of a metropolitan
paper for a fee declared sufficient to cover only supposed publishing costs was held improper as constituting solicitation of business
by advertisement. 10 The committee in forming its judgment in
the opinion last cited emphasized that payment for the publicity
indicated that an advertisement was intended. Opinion 14311
Opinion 36, p. 121.
Opinion 120, pp. 249-251.
6 Opinion 232, pp. 463-464.
8 Opinion 5, pp. 61-62.
* Opinion 7, pp. 66-70.
'Opinion 111, pp. 236-237.
'pp. 129-130.
10 Opinion 43, pp. 131-132.
11 pp. 296-297.
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clearly condemned as unethical the action of a member of the bar
in permitting and acquiescing in newspaper comment about the
case of an unwed mother in whose behalf he was serving professionally, and in posing for pictures with her as she penned the
story of her betrayal. Repeated publication by a newspaper of
complimentary remarks concerning an attorney, his reputation,
and new offices has been labeled indirect advertising even though
done without his request or consent. 12 The committee went a step
farther than mere disapproval, and imposed upon the attorney the
duty of securing cessation of such publication in his behalf.
Two special problems involving solicitation and advertising
as discussed by the committee in several of its opinions deserve
special mention. The first concerns the sponsoring of newspaper
advertisements by bar associations. Declared to be improper is
the volunteering of legal information in paid advertisements which
might be construed as solicitation of professional employment and
which might result in loss of esteem for the profession in the eyes
of the public. 13 Not without misgivings, the committee approved
publication of educational and instructive information under the
following conditions: (1) no pictures or pictorial illustrations may
be used; (2) usual features of ordinary advertising such as catch
phrases must be omitted, and (3) the article used may not extol
or mention individuals, but must be published in the name of the
bar association.
ADVERTISING BY ASSOCIATION

PERMISSIBLE

In a well-written opinion concerning the question of using
advertising facilities to acquaint the public with the benefits of
preventive legal services, the committee directed that such a campaign must be carried on by an organized bar association in order
to avoid any semblance of personal solicitation or the impression of
a selfish desire to create greater professional employment.14 Furthermore, it must be made clear to the public in a dignified manner
consistent with the conditions laid down in Opinion 121, supra,
that the primary objective of the advertisements is to make beneflicial information available to the public at large and to aid practioners in improving their professional services.
The committee approved of the plan of having a panel of lawyers selected and supervised by a bar association to provide legal
services to certain low-income groups at reduced rates without any
publicity being given to the names of panel members.1 5 However,
it condemned as solicitation through advertisement of professional
employment in behalf of specifically named lawyers, the plan of a
group of lawyers to render legal services at low rates to per12Opinion
1" Opinion
14 Opinion
5 Opinion

62, pp. 156-157.
121, pp. 251-253.
179, pp. 354-358.
205, pp. 415-417.
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sons in reduced circumstances who were to be apprised of the
plan by publications bearing the names of the particular lawyers
involved. 16 Opinion 179 was cited favorably when approbation was
lent to the maintenance of a lawyer's reference service for the benefit of the public, the committee at the same time being very explicit
in stating that Canon 27 is applicable to advertising by bar associations and prohibits the solicitation of professional
employment
17
by an organized bar for any particular lawyer.
The second special problem relates to announcement cards sent
out by lawyers upon retirement from government service. Three
opinions clearly point up the limitations involved in the use of
such cards.'
It is proper for a lawyer upon returning to practice
from government service to send out announcement cards to clients
and members of the bar, stating simply that he has returned. However, the opinions are consistent in holding that any statement
about his experience and connections with particular governmental agencies is unethically improper and constitutes the type of
advertising barred by Canon 27.
PUBLICATION OF CARDS No LONGER SANCTIONED

The subject of much discussion among members of the bar has
been the use of professional cards. Early opinions, which appeared
before the amendment of 1937, declared not to be improper per se
the publication of ordinary simple business cards giving the attorney's name, address and his legal specialties, this matter being
deemed to be one of personal taste or local custom."1 : This opinion
specifically sanctioned such publication in local newspapers where
established by custom; and it was followed in a later opinion which
declared improper the publication of a business card in a daily
newspaper in any community where the same is not a custom of
long standing generally followed by the practicing members of the
particular locality. The committee at the same time stated that
a mere list of lawyers in a newspaper was not a law list within the
0
However, Opinion 2421
meaning of the term used in Canon 43 .2
said nothing about extending this custom and forbade the publication of professional cards in association or society journals or
programs.
Subsequent to the amendment of 1937, committee rulings on
the matter of publication of professional cards changed, and publication in newspapers as a matter of local custom is no longer
recognized and approved.2 2 The customary use now referred to in
Canon 27 is only that use recognized by general custom which re"' Opinion 191, pp. 376-378.
17 Opinion
227, pp. 453-458.
18Opinion 184, pp. 366-367 ; Opinion 228, pp. 458-459; Opinion 264, pp. 545-548.
19Opinion 11, pp. 81-83.
20 Opinion 69, pp. 164-169.
"pp. 98-100.
"Opinion 182, pp. 361-362; Opinion 203, pp. 408-411; Opinion 260, pp. 536-537;
Opinion 276, 34 A. B. A. Journal 335 (1948).
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stricts publication to reputable law lists or legal directories. The
omission of the term "local custom" in the 1937 amendment "discloses an intent to withdraw the previous sanction of any local
23
custom permitting such an obvious form of advertising."
Biographical information now permitted to be published in
reputable law lists is discussed in the second paragraph of the
canon. Once the subject of much dispute, permissible items of information were listed in the amendment of 1940. The canon itself
should be consulted in case of doubt.

LAW AND ETHICS IN A WORLD AT WAR*
JACK FOSTER
Editor, Rocky Mountain News

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Colorado Bar Association:
May I call to your minds a picture from the past? Just a while
ago-five, ten, forty, fifty years-a young man and a young woman
stood before a bank of'seven old gentlemen in somber black robes.
Their cheeks were shining; their eye were burning with the blessed
idealism of their years. Their lips were saying in hushed cadences:
I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall

appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe
to be honestly debatable under the law of the land . . .
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes con-

fided in me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,
and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or
false statement of fact or law .. .
I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself,
the cause of the defenseless or oppressed or delay any man's cause
for lucre or malice . . .

There was a silence in the panelled room when they had finished. There was a quiet in the faces of everyone present. For
these young people had taken the oath to protect, as God gave
them the strength to do, the body of law against the eternal conspiracy of men of evil purpose. They promised, at the same time,
if given the chance, to add new toughness to the fiber of law, so
that at least in their time and place the poor and oppressed might
say: Here was our only protection!
Who were this young man and woman? They were you,
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Colorado Bar Association . . . just
a while ago.
I will not ask you at this pleasant luncheon in one of the most
pleasant of hotels to examine yourself and ask: How far have I
strayed? That might be embarrassing to you-and me. That
might disturb your dreams. It might even be considered impolite.
23Opinion 182, p. 362.
* An address given before the 51st Annual Meeting of the Colorado Bar Association
at Colorado Springs, October 14, 1950.
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No one can compare the uncompromising ambitions of his youth
with the settled realities of middle years, and come out very well.
But it was ever thus, and I am not the Don Quixote to try to
change it-at
least, all in one speech.
I do have, however, a singleness of purpose in urging you to
bring back to mind the day that you took the oath. I want you
to try to relive the excitement, the sense of triumph, the horizonless hope for the future that you enjoyed the morning you were
admitted to the bar. For the threat and challenge of the times
in which we live ought, it seems to me, stir within you the same
glorious sensations that you had then.
When I was invited, through the generosity of your program
committee, to make this talk, my mind wandered over many fields.
But always it came back to the same place. War. International
conflict. Bleached bones on a pock-marked meadow. Wrangling
in the dark halls of diplomacy. The thunder of guns and the
cry of the wounded. And the people back home, waiting fearfully,
praying for some surcease sometime.
This is the great sorrow of our time: That no matter where
we go or what we do, we cannot ever escape the titanic struggle
that dominates the age in which we live. The struggle began before
1914, and it has been mounting with increasing horror ever since.
There were years when we thought we enjoyed a feverish kind
of peace, dancing either with the jazz babies or the withered
crones of the depression. But always we came back to the same
rendezvous-the blood-soaked battle field.
But what, I asked myself, has this to do especially with the
lawyers whom I am to address? And then the answer came, as
it should have come sooner, that it has everything to do with you.
For you, ladies and gentlemen of the bar, in many ways are the
chief figures in this world-wide revolutionary conflict. The basic
conflict lies between the human law of the Anglo-Saxon world
that you represent and the cold and merciless law of the Soviet
state. The fundamental battle is between the right of the individual
to be tried, with a presumption of innocence, according to the
magnitude of his alleged crime, and a system that proclaims that
the extent of a man's crime depends solely on its probable effect
on the state.
SOVIET LAW AS A TOOL OF THE STATE

"Law is politics." That is what Lenin said when the Bolsheviks swept the tattered remnants of royalty from their palaces
at Petrograd in 1917. And Soviet jurisprudence never has departed from this principle. Law is a tool of the state, an instrument of policy in the hands of the class which controls the state.
In preparing these notes-to contrast our laws with theirsI am indebted to Cornell University's excellent handbook on Rus-
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sia which quotes Andre Y. Vyshinski at length on the principles
and procedures of Soviet jurisprudence. Vyshinski, you will remember, prosecuted the baffling treason trials in the late 30's and
also represented the Soviets in the Nuremberg war criminal trials.
Therefore, he is--or at least was at the last word-an authority
on the subject. Said Vyshinski:
Soviet law is a combination of the rules of behavior, established
in the form of statutes by the workers' government, reflecting their
Will. In their application they are enforced by the entire coercive
power of the socialist state, for the purpose of protecting, strengthening and developing relationships and procedures suitable and beneficial to the workers . . . for the purpose of completely and for all
time destroying capitalism and its relics in economic life, social life
and in the consciousness of mankind ... for the purpose of building a
communist society.

There, in bold relief, stands an image of the true enemy.
Back of the smoke and dirt of Korea, back of the iron pressure
of Germany, back of the shadowy maneuverings of men in our
midst stands the actual foe-the conception of Soviet law. There,
if it should ever triumph over the world, stands death for us all,
and black and bitter fear for the little people for ages to come.
Soviet law basically is concerned with one thing and one
thing alone: Have the actions of this defendant hindered the
increasing power of the proletariat state? Have his deeds revealed
any doubt as to the divine truth of the principles of Marx, Engels,
Lenin? Has he given comfort to the wicked world of capitalism?
As INDIVIDUAL
There is little concern in Soviet law with the Anglo-Saxon
conception of justice for man as a human being. There is no
regard for the principle of presumption of innocence, unique in
English and American law. There is no expression of the right
of any man accused to appear before his neighbors, to plead his
case through counsel, to be tried solely and exclusively for the
crime that he, as a man, allegedly has committed.
The Soviet code is specific and consistent in carrying out
this political principle of law. The criminal laws are designed to
protect the state from socially dangerous acts. Socially dangerous
acts are defined as those that violate the order of things established by the proletarian dictatorship for the period of transition
to a Communist regime. The intentions of the criminal are considered important, but acts are considered illegal which the doer
considered harmless but which led to consequences that he should
have foreseen.
Trial by jury is not provided for: There is no provision whatever for a man to appear before his neighbors, plead his case, be
judged by them! And that, I suppose, when all els is shorn away,
is the symbolic difference between their law and ours, their way
from the cradle to the grave and ours.
No
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Ever since I began making these occasional talks before groups
such as yours, I have thought more and more deeply about the
jury system and its importance today. And I always have come
to the same conclusion, the conclusion reached by a committee of
the American Bar Association a few years ago: " . . . trial by
jury is the best means within our knowledge of keeping the administration of justice in tune with the community." There is no
better. I do not pretend to know much about law. But I do know
what gives me the most overwhelming satisfaction of them all
in the slow blossoming of the, democratic processes. That satisfaction comes from watching an American jury in action. It
comes from the realization that there, sitting in twelve well-worn
chairs, are the baker and mechanic, the banker and housewife,
selected to judge the alleged offense of one of their neighbors
against their community and his.
These people from our midst were the true enemies of Naziism and Fascism and are enemies now of an even more persistent
force. For they have said and are saying: "We the multitude are
capable of judging ourselves, and no power of superstate or steeljawed dictator can ever match our quiet strength."
In twenty-five years as reporter and editor, I have talked
with hundreds of jurors. I remember discussing this with a distinguished group of federal judges in Santa Fe one morning, and
I remember telling how I had listened to the woes of these jurors,
had heard them express their fears, had watched the troubled
lines of regret cross their faces as their foreman handed in a
verdict of first-degree murder.
Many of them were serving unwillingly. They deplored their
loss of time and money. Many of them had pleaded fervently to
be excused-on real and, in many cases, fictitious reasons. Many
of them in their hearts opposed capital punishment. Yet they
promised that they would reach their verdicts on the basis of the
law involved.
THE JuRY AS A DEMOCRATIC BULWARK
And yet I have found, from watchings of jurors in action, that,
when they actually get down to the job of hearing a case, they
are conscientious, solemn, deliberate and long-suffering citizens.
They realize' fully the seriousness of the assignment that they as
citizens have. Despite the ineptitude and incomplete discussion
of the high importance of jury service on the part of some judges,
they seem to know that this is a great and fundamental privilege
of all Americans. And, as a rule, I have found, they reach a verdict that is tolerant, reasonable, in keeping with the average
thinking of the community.
And that is as it should be. The jury system is the means
by which the law is kept from being the aloof and haughty thing
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that it sometimes seeks to become. The jury system is the tie
that anchors the law close to heart and mind of the people where
it belongs. The jury system is the method by which evidence
eventually is sifted, methods by which this evidence was obtained
are challenged, and a man accused of crime is given as fair a
deal as is possible under all the weaknesses and frailties of being
human.
If it were not for the jury system how far the third degree
might go I shudder to think. Cruelty of police questioning has
been all too common as things are now. There was the Wisconsin
policeman who beat a confession out of a man. There was the
Michigan officer who hung a skeleton in a room to obtain a confession. There were the Florida authorities who chained a defendant overnight into a mosquito-infested cell and quqestioned him
the next day with the scalp of a dead woman at his feet. There
have been examples of black and horrible brutality in our own
Colorado police headquarters.
But always these practices have been deplored. And the
United States Supreme Court, ever mindful of the twelve men
sitting in the jury box, has repeatedly said that cruelty is not law,
that flogging and forced going without sleep and painful and blinding light have no part in our courts.
"The wrack and the torture chamber may not be substituted
for the witness stand." These are the words of the late Chief
Justice Hughes. And in McNabb v. U. S. you ladies and gentlemen will remember that the third degree has been called by the
Supreme Court, with an expression of contempt, for what it actually is: "'An easy but self-defeating way for brains as an instrument of crime detection."
Thus it has been in the British Isles and America since the
days of James II. "Putting the question" it was called then with
malicious humor. A turn of the screw. The question. A turn of
the screw. The question. A turn of the screw. The question.
With scribes sitting around to note the tortured words of the
victim. That was the last period in our history in which brutality
was an accepted part of the judicial processes.
No PROTECTION AGAINST COERCED CONFESSIONS

Not so under Soviet law. Search as I did, I could not find a
single restriction placed on the use of force to obtain confessions,
and even with the meager information that trickles through the
rusty holes in the iron curtain, we can come to only one conclusion:
That many means are countenanced to obtain a confession. Certainly there is an appalling difference between the heroic defiance
of the great Cardinal Mindzenty before he was arrested and the
weak and empty skeleton he was in the courtroom. The sorrow
of the thousands of smaller people whisked away in the dead of
night lay on his face.

DICTA

Vol. 28

It is for them and him-the thousands of people of our timesdenied the protective arm of justice under law-that you, as lawyers, must be fighting in this titanic struggle that has engulfed
our world. It is of them that you must think every day that you
enter the courtroom, every time you face a jury. And you should
rejoice in the role that history has given you. It is the last and
the best struggle of them all. For you are defending human law
against the law of the barbarian; you are giving meaning on earth
to the soul that God breathed into life at birth.
What is our law? Our Anglo-Saxon law that we call human?
Long ago, as I wandered the streets of Santa Fe, immersed in the
ancient history of the city, I reached a definition that to me, at
least, is a portrait. May I repeat it to you?
Law is a measuring stick of conduct. It is the rule established
by men of good will to produce the greatest contentment to the
greatest number in a world that otherwise would have no order. But
it is not an end unto itself. It is rather an expression of principles
that change as history changes, that shift as the need for mercy and
charity increase.
Brought into being by the mind of man, the law has all of man's
frailties. Therefore, being strong in one generation and inadequate
in another, as the races of men are, it must be subject to perpetually
changing interpretations. But, throughout these changes in interpretation, it must always have as its indestructible goal the burning
resolve that the lowliest of men can come before it and be judged
without prejudice, without malice, without contempt. The law isor should be--and must be-the unassailable faith of a free people
who voluntarily have accepted these restraints so that none of their
number need go to the grave with the black belief that life was set
against him.

There are many among you, I am sure, who would add to or
detract from that definition. There are many among you who
know more, write better, certainly speak more eloquently than I.
But all of us will agree, I think, that the basic purpose of law is to
give mankind as an individual a chance to live in happiness, in
security, in an atmosphere of achievement, in freedom of mind
during the few years he has on earth.
BRANDING AGGRESSIVE WAR AS A CRIME

Since the time I wrote those sentences another phase of the
Great War has come to a close. And in that space another-and,
I believe, even more glorious-pronouncement has come in the
slow evolution of law. For the first time in history the nations
of the world have joined together, at Nuremberg, and branded
the waging of aggressive war as a crime punishable by death. It.
is a policy of stupendous implications: For six thousand years
one nation has attacked another, leaving in the wake of the sword,
bloody and swollen corpses, ravished families, burning homes and
shattered dreams of artists, devastation, despair and chaos. It
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has always been the greatest of all crimes. Yet never before have
the nations of the world said that the men who start these wars
must be indicted, arrested, tried on evidence and punished as is
the common murderer. Even though they themselves may never
have fired a canon or dropped a bomb, they are guilty because
they conspired against humanity, and if found guilty must be
thrown to the suffocating muscles of the noose.
Even before the war ended military teams of four nationsincluding perhaps some of you-gathered evidence, questioned
prisoners, prepared indictments, so that when the shooting ended,
law was given the opportunity to take over. At the same time,
the prosecuting nations were drawing up the principles of jurisprudence and outlining the crimes to be punished. These were:
1. Crimes against peace. These principally were involved in
the waging of aggressive war.
2. War crimes. These consisted largely of violation of the
customs of war, ill-treatment of prisoners, deportation of prisoners to slave labor camps.
3. Crimes against humanity. These consisted, for the most
part, of torture to and extermination of civilian populations, persecutions on racial, religious and political grounds . . . of which
no war has even seen more sickening examples.
During the latter stages of that war, when preparations were
being made for these trials, it was argued by some that we oughf
to wait until the shooting had ended before establishing the rules.
It was argued by others that we Were writing the law to fit the
crime after the crimes had already been committed. It was complained by Goering, who eventually died by a pill from his own
poisoned hand, that the victor always determines the rules, and
that is not law.
TRIBUNAL

ESTABLISHED

DESPITE OBJECTIONS

But all these objections were cast aside in the fervent belief
of the free peoples of the earth that sometime the law of war must
be declared-and that it must be done now. It might not be a
perfect law, but at least it would be a statement to all the world
that hereafter the war makers will not escape but will be brought
to the judgment seat and face the finger of prosecuting humanity.
I want to turn to the magnificent opening statement of Justice Robert L. Jackson, prosecutor for the United States, in the
gabled courthouse of bomb-torn Nuremberg. For his words have
burning significance to us all in the troublesome days that lie
darkly ahead of us. They are words that should be read, as you
would read a prayer book, to every one of you. They grew out of
the bloody dust of buried wars. They offer the only hope, under
law, for the peace of tomorrow.
Justice Jackson recognized the fact that as he said: "Never
before in legal history has an effort been made to bring within
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the scope of a single litigation the developments of a decade, covering a whole Continent and involving a score of nations, countless
individuals and innumerable events."
He admitted the charge that new law was being created to
meet these circumstances. "But," he said, "if it be thought that
the Charter . . . does contain new law, I still do not shrink from
demanding its strict application by this Tribunal . . . I cannot
subscribe to the perverted reasoning that society may advance
and strengthen the rule of law by the expenditure of morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may never be made at
the price of morally guilty lives."
All law, he agreed, is a process of evolution, and International
Law today is in that stage during which humanity is seeking to
drag itself from the mud of eternal battle to the dry, warm shore
of peace. "The fact is," he said, "That when the law evolves by
the case method, as did the Common Law and as International Law
must do if it is to advance at all, it advances at the expense of those
who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error."
Those 20 broken old men, almost forgotten now, whose evil
machinations virtually wiped out a generation, were the ones who
had guessed wrongly. Yet, despite their record that was open as
the bruised and bleeding face of Europe, they must be tried, Justice
Jackson said, only on a presumption of innocence. For, he added,
in language that reaches back to the spiritual magnitude of Shakespeare: "We must never forget that the record on which we judge
these defendants today is the record on which history will judge
us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put
it to our own lips as well."
CIVILIZATION THE COMPLAINANT

AT BAR

And finally, in a plea that ranks, I think, among the golden
eloquence of our language, Justice Jackson, insisting that civilization was the real complaining party at the bar, brought his argument to a conclusion:
It is not necessary among the ruins of this ancient and beautiful
city, with untold members of its civilian inhabitants still buried in
its rubble, to argue the proposition that to start an agressive war has
the moral qualities of the worst of crimes. The refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that International Law will lag so far
behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in
the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law.
Civilization asks whether law is so laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this order
of importance. It does not expect that you make war impossible.
It does expect that your judicial action will put the forces of International Law, its precepts, its prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women of good will in
all countries may have 'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath
the law.'

Thus Justice Jackson put before this first tribunal the case of
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the People of the World v. the Murderers of the World, and they
were tried, found guilty and in ignominy put away.
And now, ladies and gentlemen of the bar, we are engaged in
another phase of that Great War. Once again-less than five years
after these 20 broken old men were cast to the dust or the jail cellan aggressive nation has challenged the peoples of the world by
war. By today's dispatches it looks as if within a few weeks the
armies of the United Nations will have destroyed the military
power of North Korea and have occupied the entire country-for
this time, at least.
Then once again, wearily and perhaps cynically, the Tribunal
of Nations will leave their farms and cities, gather again at some
Nuremberg to try the men who plotted this conspiracy-the men
men who gave the orders to fire on hand-bound prisoners, to destroy civilian populations in their mad pursuit. There will be a
feverish outcry in some quarters against this procedure. There
will be those who will say that this was only a police action,
and not really a war. Such a trial, they will say in fear, would
disturb the balance of what they call peace, and lead rather to
conflict than to order. The issue will be complicated by the fact
that unquestionably one of the four trial nations at Nuremberg will
not participate in the action. Indeed, Russia with all her grim
stubbornness will oppose the trial, and will seek to line up member
states of the United Nations on her side.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLY APPROACH TO WORLD SANITY

It will not be easy. It will be hard to track the guilty down.
But the Tribunal of Nations, once having declared that aggressive
war is a crime and the perpetrators shall be tried under law, must
not-and cannot-fail to act. Then, as never before, the forces
of those who believe that International Law is the only possible
approach to world sanity will need sympathy, support and belligerent faith on the part of our people.
And especially they will need this from you, the ladies and
gentlemen of the bar. For you are the ones who pledged just a
while ago-five, ten, forty, fifty years-that you would accept law,
not men, as the only true guiding light of mankind on earth. Now,
within not many weeks, you will have your chance to prove, on the
largest possible scale, whether that oath you took was merely a
few empty words said by rote to help you make a living.
An ancient Roman, old Caius Marius, once said a long time
ago: "The law speaks too softly to be heard amidst the din of
arms." And that unfortunately too often has been true. But I
hope that in Colorado at least the voice of law will speak loudly
and with fervent faith when the cause of world punishment and
world justice comes before the bar. For, after all, there is always
another kind of law waiting malignantly in the shadows.
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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXATION
BY ALBERT J. GOULD AND KENNETH L. SMITH
of the Denver Bar

THE REVENUE ACT OF 1950

Rates: An individual in the lowest bracket will pay about 5%
more on his 1950 return than he did on his 1949 return, and about
20% more for 1951 than he did in 1949. Trusts and estates pay
at the same rate as individuals.
Exemptions: An individual-$600 for himself, $600 for his
spouse on joint return, and $600 for each dependent. No change
in definition of dependent. Additional exemptions of $600 for
blind persons and $600 for persons 65 years of age or over still
in effect.
Death of spouse: Surviving spouse can make joint return for
self and deceased if survivor does not remarry before close of his
taxable year where no executor has been appointed before last day
for filing return by survivor. If executor has been appointed survivor can make joint return with executor or administrator.
Estimated tax: No change in requirements for filing declaration of estimated tax and no penalty for under-statement if same
results from increase in rates.
New corporation rates: For taxable year beginning after
July 1, 1950, 25% on all normal tax net income. 20% on surtax
net income over $25,000. This means that the corporation tax on
incomes of $25,000 or less is 25% instead of the former graduated
rates.
Corporationliquidated in 1951: Section 112 (b) (7) IRC, as
amended by Section 206 of the 1950 Act, permits complete liquidation in any one month of 1951 of a corporation and payment of
income tax under normal rates only on earned surplus account.
Do not be misled: The earned surplus account is taxed without
reference to whether it is represented by cash or has been incorporated in the tangible assets. Where the earned surplus account
is not too large this section may be of value. See rulings under
similar provisions applicable in 1944.
Depletion: The base has been broadened to include transportation of ores or minerals in some instances. See Section 207 (a)
amending IRC Section 114 (b) (4) (B).
Extra month for return of fiduciary: Any estate or trust,
the taxable year of which ends after September 23, 1950, has three
months and fifteen days after expiration of said taxable year within

March, 1951

DICTA

which to file return. A decedent's estate may pay in four installments commencing with the filing date of the return. A trust
must pay in entirety on or before the due date of return.
Redemption of parent's stock by subsidiary: If interested,
study carefully this new Section, which is intended to plug a loophole.
Redemption of stock to pay death taxes: Section 209 (a)
gives special relief where stock is redeemed solely for the purpose of
paying estate, inheritance, legacy or succession taxes resulting
from deceased owner's death.
Capital gains and losses: Literary, musical, artistic or similar works are no longer capital assets. Section 210.
Collapsible corporation: Section 212 adds Section 117 (m).
(2) (A) which defines a collapsible corporation as one which is
formed or availed of principally to manufacture, construct or produce property with a view to sale of its stock or distribution to
its shareholders before the corporation can realize a substantial
part of the net income which will arise from such property. This
provision is not as all inclusive as it might seem. We recommend
careful study.
Amortization of emergency facilities: As in the second World
War, emergency facilities may be amortized in 60 months by obtaining a certificate from a certifying authority which will be created for that purpose.
POST-MARITAL PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

In Cornelia Harris,the majority of the U. S. Supreme Court
held that a post-marital property settlement agreement is not subject to gift tax if it is based upon a decree of a divorce court, and
held that a separation agreement incorporated in a divorce decree
is "based upon a decree."
Comment: Because this was a 5 to 4 decision, caution is in
order, and the agreement should be incorporated in the decree.
ADMINISTRATOR HELD LIABLE FOR INTESTATE'S INCOME TAX

In L. T. McCourt, 15 Tax Court No. 96, the administrator was
held personally liable for the intestate's income tax because the
administrator distributed all assets, remaining after payment of
debts, to the widow.
CORPORATE PROPERTY AS DIVIDEND

In Trinity Securities, T. C. Memo, 24803, the Tax Court held
again that a corporation pays no tax on its property which has increased in value and is distributed in kind as a dividend.
EXCESS PROFIT HIGHLIGHTS

Effective July 1, 1950. Income for entire year 1950 computed
and divided for purpose of excess profits tax. Resulting income
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and excess profits tax for 1950 about 57%; for 1951 about 77%.
Generally speaking all income above 85% of the average of the
incomes of the best three out of four years of the 1946-1949 period
constitutes excess profits, taxable at 30%. Generally speaking,
also, new corporations have a credit of 12% of invested capital and
75% of borrowed capital. Instead of $10,000 exemption as in the
last World War, now all corporations have an exemption of $25,000
for excess profits tax purposes. IRC Sections 45 and 129 permit
the Commissioner in certain instances to combine incomes of associated companies where division lacks a business purpose.

PROBATE INSTITUTE SCHEDULED FOR GREELEY
Probate problems of the average-sized estate will be the subject
of the 1951 spring institute sponsored by the Weld County Bar
Association for the benefit of Northeastern Colorado lawyers. This
year's institute is scheduled for Saturday, March 31 in the Courthouse at Greeley beginning at 1:00 p. m.
The institute panel is being furnished by the Colorado Bar
Association Legal Institute Committee under the chairmanship of
Charles H. Haines, Jr., and will be moderated by the Honorable
C. Edgar Kettering, Denver county judge. Charles A. Baer will
speak on recent decisions affecting administration, Barkley L. Clanahan will discuss practical administrative problems, Hubert D.
Henry will cover actual drafting of a will for the average-sized
estate, and Merrill A. Knight will explain the various devices for
the transfer of assets without administration.
William H. Southard, chairman of the Weld County Bar Association committee sponsoring the institute, has announced that a
social hour and dinner at the American Legion Home will follow
the panel discussion. Chancellor Albert C. Jacobs of the University
of Denver will be the dinner speaker.
The Weld County association has been holding these institutes
for many years, and as usual expects to draw a large attendance
from other associations in Northeastern Colorado, particularly the
Boulder, Larimer and Thirteenth Judicial District bars.
PREACHER LONG SPREADS THE GOSPEL
Lawrence A. Long of Denver, lively chairman of the state
association's Unauthorized Practice committee, has made a number
of trips to local bar association meetings in the past several months
as part of his campaign to alert lawyers to the dangers of unauthorized practice. On February 20 Mr. Long addressed a monthly
meeting of the El Paso County Bar Association in Colorado Springs,
and on March 6 he was the principal speaker for the semi-annual
meeting of the Larimer County Bar Association in Fort Collins.
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JOINT TENANCY LEAFLETS AVAILABLE
"Joint Tenancy-Is It Wise For Me?", an information leaflet
for the general public prepared by the Public Relations committee
and printed, and initially distributed, through the courtesy of the
Denver Clearing House Banks Association, is also available without
charge to association members for distribution to their clients. A
few sample copies of this leaflet were sent to all members as inserts
with the February Dicta, and further quantities may be obtained
simply by writing to the secretary at 319 Chamber of Commerce
Bldg., Denver 2.
Under the chairmanship of Sydney H. Grossman, the Public
Relations committee, has also requested the out-of-Denver members of the Board of Governors to work with local bar association
presidents in attempting to secure mass distribution through local
banks, savings and loan associations, and other reputable groups.
Such groups may obtain quantity lots of the joint tenancy leaflets
for inclosure in their monthly statements, just as was done by the
Denver clearing house banks. Some 90,000 have thus far been
distributed by this method. The bar association is willing to furnish copies of the leaflet without charge, unless the institutions
wish to have their own names imprinted on the face of the leaflet
in which case they may do so by payment to the printer of a charge
of $8 per thousand.
This is the second of such public information leaflets prepared
by the association for general distribution in recent years. The
first was the popular "Wills-their importance and why you should
have one." It should be added that there are still limited numbers
of this leaflet available upon request, but for association members
only.
Credit for the new leaflet goes to Victoria Fowler Gross of
Englewood, who authored the main text, and to Harold E. Popham
who reviewed the material before publication. Mr. Grossman also
extended the thanks and recognition of the bar association to Richard P. Brown, trust officer of the International Trust Company,
who, as representative of the Denver Clearing House Banks Association, arranged for the printing and mass distribution. Parenthetically, Mr. Grossman pointed out that a recent article on the
same subject of joint tenancy was prepared and published in the
Midland Savings Bank semi-annual newspaper through the efforts
and good offices of two other members of the Public Relations
committee, Paul M. Hupp and Donald M. Lesher.
Clayton Dorsey Knowles has announced the opening of an
office at 414 Denver National Bank Bldg.
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BOOK NOTICE
COLORADO ACCIDENT LAW DIGEST. By Richard D. Hall of the Den-

ver Bar. Privately Printed, 1950. pp. 268. $11.50.
Books relating strictly to Colorado law are scarce. The ones
-other than compilation of statutes-that have been printed in
the last twenty years can be counted on the fingers of one hand.
Practitioners in populous states, such as New York, Pennsylvania,
and others have the benefit of the publication each year of several
law books relating to aspects of the law of their respective states.
The lawyers of such states are saved much time from repetitious
research into the labyrinth of the case and statute law of their particular jurisdiction by such books.
Colorado lawyers, then, will welcome this worthy addition to
the small list of books on Colorado law. The book is what the
title says it is: a digest. Pertinent statutes are set out, but the
cases are digested, and digested briefly at that. In fact, one using
the book for the first time might quarrel with the extreme brevity
of the digests of the cases. "Plaintiff" is written "Pltff"; "defendant," "Def"; "judgment," "Judg."; and so on. For brevity's
sake, the author frequently does not make complete sentences,
particularly where the meaning of his phraseology is obvious and
space and time would be wasted by using more words.
The author has digested more than six hundred Colorado
cases relating to negligence. It will, perhaps, come as a surprise
to learn that there are that many cases in this state on that one
subject of torts law. The researcher who goes to the standard
digests available to the Colorado lawyer will wonder what titles
Mr. Hall looked under to find so many negligence cases.
The division of the book into parts and headings is as utilitarian as it is novel and interesting. The six principal parts of the
book are divided as follows: Suits against owners or operators of
vehicles; suits against owners or occupants of real estate; suits
against businesses and professional men; suits against owners or
possessors of personal property; miscellaneous accident suits, and
an appendix. By far the largest number of cases come under the
first principal part, that is, suits against owners or operators of
vehicles. That principal part is divided into twenty-two sub-divisions. The mentioning of a few of such sub-divisions will
show the practicality of utility of the authors's classification. For
instance, among such twenty-two sub-divisions are the titles:
Two car rear-end accidents; two car left-turn accidents; and two
car head-on collision accidents.
The sixth principal part of the book-the appendix-is alone
worth the price of the entire book. The appendix contains no
digest of cases-they appear in the preceding 219 pages. The first

March, 1951

DICTA

two parts of the appendix deal with jury instructions based on
actual Colorado cases. They are followed by a third part which
cites, under appropriate headings, cases involving "selected" tort
doctrines. There are ten such doctrines listed, some of which are:
family car doctrine; last clear chance doctrine; and sudden emergencies doctrine. The last part of the appendix contains a complete table of the cases digested.
The work purports to cover the Colorado Reports, volumes 1
to 120, inclusive, and the Colorado Bar Association Advance Sheets
through June, 1950. The author, in his preface, states that pocket
parts will be issued every two or three years so as to keep the
digest up-to-date.
All in all, your reviewer is of the opinion that Mr. Hall's book
will serve as a very useful entree to the Colorado case and statute
law of negligence for the busy practitioner.
WILLSON HURT.

THE PLAINTIFF PRO SE
In a case pending before Judge Francis J. Knauss in the Denver District Court, the defendant filed a motion to quash the summons. In connection with this motion, the plaintiff pro se filed a
"Reply, and Motion and Request for Hearing," in which it is stated:
That defendant's Motion to Quash Summons cites as grounds therefore non compliance with 'Rule 4 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure,' whereas said Rule 4 as cited by defendant's attorney covers a
total of fifteen and one-half pages in its entirety as published therein,
and that therefore defendant's grounds are pointless, ambiguous, impossible of determination, capricious, superfluous, out of place, dilatory,
too pointless to be interpreted in the light of the complete 15 pages
devoted to said cited rule, and without the realm of dignified reason
and accurate identification or meaning as applied to this Case, and
therefore plaintiff verily believes, as it appears, that said Motion was
made for the purpose of consuming the time of this plaintiff and of this
Honorable Court needlessly and without necessary and true purpose as
intended by the laws and rules of these Courts wherein any Citizen may
seek reasonably speedy and proper redress when wrongfully damaged.
(The plaintiff in this case demands judgment) of $52,638.75 plus
interest, plus costs herein expended, plus amounts arrived at as due
plaintiff from all sources shown herein said case, and all such as determined fairly by this Court as due plaintiff from defendant.

The Denver firm of Stone, Rice and Mancini has been dissolved. Joel E. Stone will continue to maintain his offices in the
E. & C. Bldg., while William L. Rice and Francis S. Mancini have
removed their offices to the Majestic Bldg. Silvio Bottone, who
was associated with the firm, is also retaining offices in the E. & C.
Bldg.
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THE LAW OF LIBEL IN COLORADO
PHILIP S. VAN CISE
of the Denver Bar

Our Supreme Court has decided thirty-one libel and slander
cases and the Court of Appeals nine. Many were reversed for new
trials, so the sums finally awarded do not appear in the reports.
These decisions, however, indicate that the amount of recovery was
very small. In one case it was only one cent.'
I have never brought a libel case, but have defended many of
them. I always tell a client when he wants to start such a suit,
"If you are above criticism start the suit, otherwise forget it."
In Colorado, by its Constitution, 2 "the jury shall determine
the law and the fact." So no matter what instructions the court
may give, they can be entirely disregarded by the jury, which may
pay no more attention to them than they do to many arguments of
counsel.
Many years ago the newspapers were not very careful of
what they said about people. The proprietor of one of them
started a libel suit, but it ended very suddenly. In the 1890's,
Tom Patterson, owner of the Rocky Mountain News, sued the
Denver Republican, the other morning paper, for libel. Tom
O'Donnell, a brilliant and forcible lawyer of the old school, was
interrogating the jury, and asked one of them:
"You have no prejudice in this case, I presume?"
Answer: "None at all, Mr. O'Donnell. However, I think that
a man who runs a newspaper should be able to take his own medicine."
Amid shouts of laughter, the case blew up.
The libel statute in Colorado is for criminal libel, but it has
been construed to apply as well as civil libel. 3 This law reads as
follows :4
A libel is a malicious defamation expressed either by printing,
or by signs, or pictures or the like, tending to blacken the memory
of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or
reputation, or publish the natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby to expose him or her to public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
Every person, whether writer or publisher, convicted of this offense,
shall be fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding one year. In all prosecutions for a libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence in justification, except libels tending to blacken the memory of the dead or
expose the natural defects of the living.

It is a penal statute and must be construed strictly.
, Byers

v. Martin, 2 Colo. 605.

II, Sec. 10.
3 Republican Publishing Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 408.
4 COLO. STAT. ANN.,
c. 48, § 199 (1935).
2Art.

There-
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fore it is essential to bear in mind the following definitions in libel,
italicized portions of all quotations being the author's :5
Impeach: "To bring an accusation against; to impute some
fault or defect to; to bring or throw discredit on: to call in question; to challenge."
Honesty: "Quality or state of being honest; freedom from
fraud."
Integrity: "Denotes uprightness or incorruptibility, moral
soundness; freedom from corrupting influence or practice, especially strictness in the fulfillment of contracts, the discharge of
agencies, trusts and the like; uprightness; rectitude."
Virtue: "Moral practice or action, conformity to the standard of right; moral excellence; integrity of character; uprightness
of conduct; rectitude; morality."
Reputation: "The estimation in which one is held; the character imputed to a person in a community or public; especially
good reputation; favorable regard; public esteem; general credit;
good name."
Hatred: "Strong aversion or detestation coupled with illwill."
Contempt: "The feeling with which one regards that which is
esteemed mean, vile or worthless; disdain, scorn."
Ridicule: "To laugh at, mockingly or disparagingly. Remarks concerning a subject or a person, designed to excite laughter
with a degree of contempt for the subject of the remarks."
Innuendo:
The office of an innuendo in pleading is to explain the defendant's
meaning in the language employed, and also to show how it relates
to the plaintiff, when that is not clear on its face. * * * It is only
where the words are not prima facie libelous that an innuendo is
necessary.'
Defamatory words actionable per se are those which on their
face and without the aid of extrinsic proof are recognized as injurious; but if the injurious character of the words appears, not from
their face in their usual and natural signification, but only in consequence of- extrinsic facts, showing the circumstances under which
they were said or the damage which resulted to the defamed party
therefrom, they are not libelous per se, and in such cases * * *
the words are said to require an innuendo.7

Colloquium:

In actions for defamation, the rule is that it must appear front
the complaint * * * that the plaintiff is the person defamed. Where
the publication forming the subject matter of the action does not
contain any direct reference to the plaintiff, the complaint must, in
order to state a cause of action, contain appropriate allegations to
show such application.
These allegations, commonly known as the colloquium, appear
to have consisted at common law of statements of factsO
'From Webster's New International Dictionary unless otherwise Indicated.
'Republican Publishing Co. v. Miner, 2 Colo. App. 568, 574.
753 C.J.S. 42.
'33 Ar. Jur. 218.

